Scheduling Timed Modules for Correct Resource Sharing

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Abstract

Real-time embedded systems typically include concurrent tasks of different priorities with time-dependent operations accessing common resources. In this context, unsynchronized parallel executions may lead to hazard situations caused by e.g., race conditions. To be able to detect such faulty system behaviors before implementation, we introduce a unified model of resource constrained, scheduled real-time system descriptions, in Alur’s and Henzinger’s rigorous framework of timed reactive modules. We take a component-based design perspective and construct the real-time system model, by refinement, as a composition of real-time periodic preemptible tasks with encoded functionality, and a fixed-priority scheduler, all modeled as timed modules. For the model, we express the notions of race condition and redundant locking, formally, as invariance properties that can be verified by model-checking.

1. Introduction

As the functionality implemented by embedded systems tends to increase, the system developers are faced with an ever greater challenge of ensuring proper operation of increasingly complex systems. A promising software engineering approach to handle the complexity of software systems in general is to adopt a component-based development (CBD) approach. In CBD, components are introduced as software modules that can be composed into larger systems. For this approach to be successful, it is of decisive importance that a system can be modeled in a modular, compositional fashion. Consequently, the designers should be equipped with adequate analysis techniques and tools (such as simulation- and model-checking, and compositional reasoning), to minimize the number of faults to be found in later system life-cycle stages.

An embedded system is often designed as a set of preemptible software modules called tasks, which are assigned priorities, and executed at runtime by a real-time operating system following some scheduling policy, e.g., fixed-priority preemptive scheduling [16, 17].

A suitable component model for this class of systems should preferably be able to capture the particular problems that may arise when a real-time system is executed according to a given real-time scheduling policy. In this setting, the challenge is to eliminate problems such as the so-called race conditions, which can produce unpredictable program behaviors [9].

Hazardous situations can also arise if high-priority tasks are blocked and delayed by lower priority ones – a phenomenon with potentially catastrophic consequences especially in safety-critical real-time applications. To minimize blocking delays, safe resource allocation mechanisms such as, e.g. the priority ceiling protocol [20], are enforced on the program.

Concurrency defects are extremely difficult to recognize. There is no general purpose approach to finding them. Techniques such as simulation and testing, which provide only partial exploration of the system state-space are of limited help in finding, e.g., intricate race conditions. Formal techniques, such as model-checking, which explore the complete state-space could potentially provide the designer with a much higher degree of assurance.

In this paper, we propose to use the timed modules formalism [4] of Alur and Henzinger, as a component-based framework of embedded real-time systems. Timed modules is an expressive and modular modeling language for dense timed systems for which refinement and model-checking of Alternating–time Temporal Logic (ATL) formulas are decidable. Moreover, the framework has tool support implemented in the MOCHA tool [3]. In order to facilitate modeling of embedded real-time systems, we show how to encode real-time tasks with both functional and timing behavior in the form of parameters such as computation time and relative deadline. We further show how to formalize and verify important properties of embedded real-time systems, such as schedulability, race condition freeness, and lack of redundant locking. Further, we sketch an encoding of the priority ceiling protocol in the model, which allows for deadlock- and race-free systems, by construction. The
salient point of our approach, as compared to other similar works [10, 12, 19], is that we provide a formal model that can be model-checked for functional correctness, as well as for timing properties and concurrency error freeness. Moreover, we construct the scheduled real-time system model by applying the compositional correctness-preserving refinement techniques of timed modules. Hence, the functional correctness can be proved once and for all on the set of unscheduled real-time tasks, as it is guaranteed to be preserved after the transformations required by the encoding of the scheduling policy.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the basics of timed modules and uniprocessor real-time scheduling. Then, we show how to model generic preemptible tasks with functionally (Section 3), and how to schedule such tasks and verify the real-time correctness of the result (Section 4). In Section 5, we formalize and show how to check properties related to resource sharing, and we introduce the priority ceiling protocol in our model. Our results are applied on an illustrative example in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and compares to related work.

2. Preliminaries

2.1 Timed Modules

The timed modules formalism, introduced by Alur and Henzinger [4] supports compositional refinement checking, ATL model checking, and reachability analysis of real-time systems.

A timed module $M$ has a finite set of typed variables, out of which some are assigned only discrete values, whereas others change continuously when time passes; the latter are real-valued clocks. Clock variables are of type clock. Since $M$ represents a system that interacts with the environment, the set of module variables is partitioned in controlled variables, which are updated by the module, and external variables, updated by the environment. Further, the set of controlled variables is also partitioned in private variables, which are not visible to the environment, and interface variables, which are visible to an external observer, as are the external variables, too. The interface variables can be modified either by the module or the environment. Both controlled and external variables can be either discrete or clock variables.

A timed module (TM) is made of one or more timed atoms. A (timed) atom $A_M$ consists of a declaration and a body. The atom declaration introduces the atom’s controlled variables and it’s awaited variables, a subset of the external variables of the module. The atom body consists of an executable initial action, an executable update action, and an executable delay. The atom’s variables are preceded by keywords such as controls, reads, awaits. Initial and update actions are specified by the keywords init and update, followed by guarded assignments. Delays are specified by the keyword delay followed by guarded invariants, where the guard constrains unprimed variables (before taking the transition) and the invariant constrains primed (after the transition) clock variables. An invariant permits all durations that do not invalidate the invariant. Basically, a timed atom is a state-machine as follows:

\[
A_M ::= \text{atom controls } x, y \text{ reads } x, y \text{ awaits } z \text{ init } x' := 0; y' := 0 \text{ update } \\
\begin{align*}
&x \leq 3 \land z' \rightarrow y := y + 1 \\
&x \leq 3 \land \neg z' \rightarrow y := y + 2 \\
&x \geq 3 \land \neg z' \rightarrow y := y + 3 \\
\text{ delay } \\
&x < 3 \rightarrow x' < 3 \\
&x \geq 3 \rightarrow x' \leq 5
\end{align*}
\]

Let us see how the atom described above executes. During the initialization round, the atom $A_M$ waits for the initial values of the awaited variable $z$ before initializing the controlled variables, $x, y$. During each subsequent round, the atom reads the values of the variables at the beginning of the round and decides which duration (possibly 0) it is prepared to let elapse. If the duration of the round is decided to be 0, then we have an update round, and the atom waits for the updated value of $z$ before updating $y$, so we have two possibilities: if the environment sets $z$ to true, the first guarded command is executed, by assigning $y + 1$ to $y$. In case $z'$ is false, the second action is executed, that is, $y := y + 2$. Then the sequence of execution rounds proceeds according to the action guards and the guards of the delay invariants, until no guard holds anymore. Notice that action two and three are nondeterministically chosen for execution, one at a time, for $x = 3$. Whenever the values of the awaited variables do not change, the values of the controlled variables may remain unchanged.

A (timed) module $M$ consists also of a declaration and a body. For our example, the timed module containing atom $A_M$ is as follows:

\[
\text{module } M \text{ external } z : \text{bool} \\
\text{interface } y : \text{nat} \\
\text{private } x : \text{clock} \\
A_M
\]

Module execution. During the initialization round, first the external variables ($z$ above) are assigned arbitrary values of the appropriate types, and then the atoms (in case there are more) in $M$ are executed in a consistent order. Each subsequent round is either an update round or a time round whose duration is permitted by all atoms. During an update round, first the external variables are assigned arbitrary values, and then the update actions of the atoms are executed in a consistent order. If several guards are true,
then one of the corresponding assignments or invariants is chosen nondeterministically. If none of the guards is true, then all controlled variables stay unchanged and no positive duration is permitted.

**Parallel composition of TMs.** We can combine two or more compatible modules into a single module by employing the parallel composition operator: $M = M_1 || M_2 || \ldots || M_n$. We say that the participating modules are compatible iff the sets of interface variables are disjoint, and the awaits dependencies among the observable variables of the modules are acyclic.

**Refinement of TMs.** The refinement checking is performed by standard language containment between the specification module and the implementation one. We say that module $M_2$ refines (implements) module $M_1$, that is, $M_2 \preceq M_1$, if every interface variable of $M_1$ is an interface variable of $M_2$, every external variable of $M_1$ is an observable variable of $M_2$, any variable awaited in $M_1$ is also awaited in $M_2$, and the projection of any trace (sequence of states) of $M_2$, with respect to the observable variables of $M_1$, is a trace of $M_1$. The refinement relation of timed modules is a preorder [4], that is, a reflexive and transitive relation. Moreover, as it is known, the existence of a timed simulation relation is a sufficient condition for proving language inclusion [4], hence refinement. Moreover, for two compatible modules $M_2$ and $M_1$, $M_2 || M_1 \preceq M_1$. Within this same framework, ATL model-checking admits and proves formulas of the form $A G p$, where $p$ is a state predicate (boolean condition). The formula states that predicate $p$ always holds $(G p)$, for all possible execution paths. The modular verification of timed modules is carried out in the model-checker MOCHA [3].

**2.2 Uniprocessor Scheduling of Real-Time Tasks**

We characterize a real-time task $T(i)$ by the following attributes:

- **minimum inter-arrival time**, $P_i$,
- **worst-case execution time**, $E_i$,
- **deadline**, $D_i$ (we require that $D_i \leq P_i$), and
- **priority**, $pr_i$.

The systems that we consider are hard real-time systems consisting of a set $i \in (1..n)$ of tasks that are all required to always complete the execution by their deadlines. In this paper, tasks are periodic (although sporadic tasks can also be modeled), meaning that they arrive at fixed intervals equal to the periods $P_i$, respectively. The timing behavior of a periodic task is exemplified in Figure 1.

The execution of tasks is governed by a scheduling policy. In this paper, we consider preemptive priority-based scheduling, in which a high-priority task that is released during the execution of a lower priority one will interrupt (preempt) the executing task and start execution in its place.

More specifically, we will first consider a fixed-priority preemptive priority-based scheduling policy in which each task is statically (before execution) assigned a fixed and unique priority. Later, we will consider that the initial task priorities might change due to a concurrency protocol regulating access to shared resources. In the first case, Leung and Whitehead [16] have shown that assigning priorities in Deadline-Monotonic (DM) order (giving tasks with shorter deadline higher priority) is optimal in the sense that if such priority assignment cannot guarantee that all tasks meet their deadlines (often referred to that they are feasible or schedulable), then no other ordering will succeed either.

Joseph and Pandaya [14] proposed a method to determine the schedulability of a task by computing its worst-case completion time relative to its release – the response time $R_i$. In the following, we assume $\Sigma_i E_i / P_i < 1$ and $R_i \leq D_i, i \in (1..n)$, that is, the tasks are schedulable.

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**Figure 1. The execution of a periodic task.**

Fixed-priority preemptive priority-based scheduling. Let us consider that $n$ preemptible, (hard) real-time tasks, $T S = \{T(1), \ldots, T(n)\}$ execute on a single CPU. Under the mentioned assumption, $D_i \leq P_i, \forall i \in (1..n)$, an optimal set of priorities can be obtained such that $(D_i < D_j \vee (D_i = D_j \land i < j)) \Rightarrow pr_i > pr_j$, for all tasks $T(i), T(j)(T(i) \neq T(j))$. If the CPU is free, the highest priority task among the waiting ones is scheduled.

**3. Task Model**

We chose to describe an arbitrary preemptible real-time task as a timed module consisting of two main blocks: the timing block and the functional block. The timing block is a state-machine that encodes the timing behavior in the form of parameters such as computation time and relative deadline. Each task can be in one of the four possible states, sl (sleeping), wt (waiting for the CPU), ex (executing), and pt (preempted). A state transition is fired only if the boolean condition that guards it evaluates to true. The functional block is a one-state transition system $(ex \rightarrow ex)$, which contains the statements that model the task’s functionality. The state-transition diagram (STD) that in fact models our real-time task is described in Figure 2.

For this model, we also assume that the environment makes arbitrary choices that we do not need to model explicitly, as one would do, e.g. in the timed-automata frame-
work [11]. Environment behavior is captured by the external variables of timed modules that can be awaited by modules, in an acyclic manner.

Figure 2. The STD modeling a preemptible real-time task’s behavior.

3.1 Encoding the Preemptible Task

Concretely, we model the generic, preemptible, periodic task \( T(i), i \in (1..n) \), as a TM made of an atom comprising the following: a choice among five guarded commands that correspond to the state transitions of Figure 2, a choice among \( n \) (finite) guarded actions that encode the task’s functionality, and a delay element, as shown in Figure 3. The model does not encode any explicit scheduling algorithm. We describe the functional behavior as block \( \text{func} \) in Figure 3.

The arrival clock \( c_{a1} \) measures the time from 0 to each task’s release. We record the completion time of each task by clock \( c_1 \). There are as many clocks \( c_{a1}, c_1, \) as tasks. We use the extra variable \( r_i \), which we initialize to \( E_i \), to store the time needed to complete the released task \( T(i) \) and possible higher priority tasks that preempted \( T(i) \) [11].

Since the tasks are periodic, their actual arrival times are fixed, that is, successive arrivals of the same task are separated by \( P_i \) time units, respectively. We model this behavior by requiring the clock \( c_{a1} \) to be equal to \( P_i \), for the task \( T(i) \) to become available. If we consider the collection of available tasks, and the initial model of a task (in Figure 3), should \( T(i) \) wait for the CPU, it could start executing right away (the guard of the second command holds), or its execution could be postponed for an arbitrary time bounded from above by \( D_i - R_i \). When selected, the task changes its state to \( \text{ex} \), and clock \( c_1 \) is reset. Upon completion of execution, when \( c_1 = r_i \), the respective task returns to state \( \text{sl} \) and the execution clock is set to 0. If the task is executing and, implicitly, its permission is removed by the virtual scheduler, the task takes the transition to state \( \text{pt} \). When the scheduler restores the task’s permission to execute, the latter returns to \( \text{ex} \) right away, or a delay step is executed, letting \( c_{a1} \) advance up to at most \( (D_i - R_i) + r_i \), provided that \( c_1 \leq r_i \). The variable \( \text{state} \) stores the current state of task \( T(i) \). Note that, in Figure 3, we assume the worst-case execution time of the task plus preemption time, thus, we check for \( c_1 = r_i \), in order to establish if the task has finished its execution. Observe also that the choice of the update statement is deterministic, except for the one between command \( \text{ex} \rightarrow \text{pt} \) and the first command of block \( \text{func} \). Hence, to reduce the model’s nondeterminism, we did not consider the more realistic case of \( c_1 \leq r_i \) for action \( \text{ex} \rightarrow \text{sl} \).

Figure 3. A preemptible task as a TM.

The parallel composition of tasks is then equated with the real-time system described by the timed module below:

\[
\text{module } \text{RTS} \triangleq \bigparallel_{i=1}^{n} \text{module } T(i),
\]

where

\[
\bigparallel_{i=1}^{n} \text{module } T(i) \triangleq \text{module } T(1) \parallel \ldots \parallel \text{module } T(n)
\]
4 Fixed-Priority Scheduling of TMs

In order to describe an arbitrary real-time task scheduled by the Deadline-Monotonic (DM) priority assignment, we introduce the auxiliary variable \( q_i \), which stores the task \( T(i) \)’s priority, \( pr_i > 0, i \in (1...n) \): when a task \( i \) is in state \( wt \), its priority is stored in \( q_i \); when the same task has finished execution, its priority is removed from \( q_i \), by the assignment \( q_i := 0 \). The variable \( q_i \) is initialized with the task’s \( T(i) \) priority, as we assume that all participating tasks are concurrently waiting for the CPU, at time 0. We also introduce the external variable \( ok_i : \) Bool. This variable encodes the permission for execution given by the scheduler to \( T(i) \); \( ok_i \) is set or reset, by the scheduler, according to the DM scheduling policy rules.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{module SchedDM} & \\
\text{external} & \\
r_1, \ldots, r_n, q_1, \ldots, q_n : \text{nat}; & \\
state_1, \ldots, state_n : \{ \text{sl, wt, ex, pt} \}; & \\
c_1, \ldots, c_n, c_1, \ldots, c_n : \text{clock} & \\
\text{interface} & \\
ok_1, \ldots, ok_n : \text{bool} & \\
\text{atom controls} (v_i \cdot \{ \text{ok} \}) & \\
\text{reads} (v_i \cdot \{ \text{ok}, r, q, state, c_1, c_n \}) & \\
\text{awaits} (v_i \cdot \{ \text{q}, state, c_1, c_n \}) & \\
\text{init} (v_i \cdot \{ \text{ok} \} := \text{false}) & \\
\text{update} & \\
\quad [\{ \text{D}_i - R_i = 0 \land state'_i = \text{wt} \} \Rightarrow \text{ok}'_i := \text{true}] & \\
\quad [\{ \text{state}'_i \neq \text{sl} \} \land \{ pr'' \neq \text{wt} \} \land \{ \text{ok} \} \land \{ pr \} = \text{Max}(q_1', \ldots, q'_n) \land state'_i = \text{wt} \land c''_i \leq \text{D}_i - R_i \} 
\quad \Rightarrow \text{ok}'_i := \text{true}] & \\
\quad \{ \text{ok}_i \land state'_i = \text{sl} \} \Rightarrow \text{ok}'_i := \text{false}] & \\
\quad \{ \text{ok}_i \land pr'' \neq \text{Max}(q_i', \ldots, q_n') \land state_i = \text{ex} \land c''_i < r_i \} \land \{ pr' \land \text{ok} \} \land \{ pr \} = \text{Max}(q_i', \ldots, q_n') \land state_i = \text{ex} \land c''_i \leq r_i \} \Rightarrow \text{ok}'_i := \text{false}] & \\
\quad \{ \{ pr'' \neq \text{wt} \} \land \{ pr \} = \text{Max}(q_i', \ldots, q_n') \land state_i = \text{pt} \land c''_i \leq r''_i \} \land \{ pr' \land \text{ok} \} \land \{ pr \} = \text{Max}(q_i', \ldots, q_n') \land state_i = \text{pt} \land c''_i \leq r''_i \} \Rightarrow \text{ok}'_i := \text{true}] & \\
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 4. The DM Scheduler module.

We want to represent the real-time scheduled system, modularly, hence, in the following, we identify each task with a timed module, denoted by \( T_{DM}(i) \), and the scheduler with timed module \( SchedDM \), described in Figure 4. Due to potential state-space explosion during verification, we assume that the time required by the scheduler to decide what task should be permitted to execute is 0. This is based on the assumption that the scheduler’s computation time is already contained in each \( R_i \), respectively.

In the scheduler component of Figure 4, \( pr_i = \text{Max}(q_i', \ldots, q_n') \) is equivalent to the boolean expression
\[
q'_i = pr_i \land (\forall j \neq i \cdot (q_j' < q_i' \land q'_j = pr_j) \lor q'_j = 0),
\]
which is used to pick the task of maximum priority out of the set of waiting or preempted tasks. Here, we also need to consider the case of urgent tasks, for which \( D_i - R_i = 0 \).

In case such a task is not the maximum priority one among waiting tasks, it will initially be permitted to execute before the highest-priority task; after that, it may be preempted by the higher-priority tasks. The first two guarded commands of the scheduler encode this rule (the second command’s guard contains the negation of the first command’s guard).

In order to encode the scheduled task, \( T_{DM}(i) \), correctly, we start from the template task described in Figure 3; first, we add \( ok_i \) to the list of external variables that are read by \( T(i) \). Then, we just strengthen the guards of actions \( sl \rightarrow wt, wt \rightarrow ex, ex \rightarrow sl, ex \rightarrow pt, \) and \( pt \rightarrow ex \), with the boolean conditions: \( \sim ok_i, ok_i, ok_i, \sim ok_i, ok_i \), respectively. Similarly, the guards of the functional block are all strengthened with \( ok_i \), and the delay invariants are modified accordingly: \( \sim ok_i \) is added to the guard of \( delay_1 \), obtaining \( delay'_1 \), and \( ok_i \) to the guards of the remaining delays, respectively, getting \( delay'_2, \ldots, delay'_4 \). Since variable \( ok_i \) is updated by the scheduler and is awaited by the task, it will be read by the latter in order to establish which transition will be fired by the module’s atom. The first refinement step is followed by a second one: declaring and updating \( q_i \), as explained at the beginning of the section. This step is basically affecting the actions \( sl \rightarrow wt \) and \( ex \rightarrow sl \).

If we denote transition \( sl \rightarrow wt \) of Figure 3 by \( A_1(i) \), and transition \( ex \rightarrow sl \) by \( A_3(i) \), we get the following refined guarded commands, after applying the transformations mentioned earlier:

\[
\begin{align*}
A_1(i) & = \text{state}_i = \text{sl} \land c_i = P_1 \land \sim ok_i \\
& \quad \Rightarrow \text{state}'_i := \text{wt}; q'_i := pr_i \\
A_3(i) & = \text{state}_i = \text{ex} \land c_i = r_i \land ok_i \\
& \quad \Rightarrow \text{c}'_i := 0; c'_i := 0; r'_i := E_i; \\
& \quad q'_i := 0; \text{state}'_i := \text{sl} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Similarly, transition \( wt \rightarrow ex \), denoted by \( A_2(i) \), becomes \( A'_2(i) \), etc. Also, the correctness-preserving guard strengthening changes all transitions within the functional block func, and we define the set of refined “functional” transitions by the generic term func'. Then, the refined task, with the encoded fixed-priority policy is:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{module } T_{DM}(i) \ldots & \\
\text{atom} \ldots & \\
\text{update} & \\
\quad [A'_1(i) \ldots A'_3(i) \| \text{func}'] & \\
\quad \text{delay} & \\
\quad \text{delay}'_1 \ldots \text{delay}'_4 & \\
\end{align*}
\]

With MOCHA, we could prove that module \( T_{DM}(i) \) is an implementation of module \( T(i) \), that is, module \( T_{DM}(i) \preceq \text{module } T(i) \) (it is easy to check that the two modules are compatible). The refinement is straightforward: if \( tr \) is a trace of module \( T_{DM}(i) \), then the projection of \( tr \) with respect to the observable variables of module \( T(i) \) is a trace of the latter.

By composing in parallel all the TMs that describe the
Consider the tasks $T(i)$ and $T(j)$, where $i, j \in (1..n)$, $i \neq j$, as timed modules described following the template of Figure 3. We say that $T(j)$ preempts $T(i)$, denoted by $T(i) \preceq T(j)$, iff the following predicate holds:

\[ \neg(state_i = ex) \land c_i < r_i \land \neg(state_j = wt) \land state'_j = pt \land state'_j = ex \]

5.1 Detecting races and redundant locking

A race condition may occur if task $T(i)$ can be preempted by $T(j)$, when both tasks are accessing a common resource. In order to eliminate such problems, the access to shared resources is controlled by locks (boolean variables) that ensure mutual exclusion.

Let us denote by $owns_{i}$ the set of locks held by task $T(i)$, at some point in time. In order to specify whether a resource is shared or not, we introduce the variable $res : \{ns, s\}$, where $ns$ stands for non-shared resource and $s$ for the opposite case. In the following, unless otherwise stated, we assume that $res = s$, and, for brevity, we omit this condition from our formalizations.

Locking and releasing the lock $l_q$ protecting shared resource $Q$, by task $T(i)$, are encoded by $owns'_i := l_q$, when $state_i = wt$, and $owns'_i := 0$, after executing the critical section, respectively.

We assume that a task $T(i)$ can own, at any time point, a (possibly empty) set of locks $l_{1Q}, \ldots, l_{nQ}$ that protect the shared resource $Q$, that is, $owns_i = \{l_{1Q}, \ldots, l_{nQ}\}$.

Taking resources into consideration, we can use the following shortcut for the preemption relation, provided that two arbitrary tasks $T(i), T(j)$ own protecting locks $l_{1Q}, l_{2Q}$, respectively:

\[ T(i) \preceq T(j) \]

\[ \equiv l_{1Q} \in owns_i \land l_{2Q} \in owns_j \land T(i) \preceq T(j) \]

In case there is just one lock $l_Q$ to protect shared resource $Q$, which is owned by $T(i)$, the syntax for $T(j)$ preempts $T(i)$, in spite of $T(i)$ owning the lock, is $T(i) \preceq T(j)$.

Consider that two tasks $T(i), T(j)$, $i \neq j$, need access to shared resource $Q$. The requirement that task $T(j)$, assumed to have higher priority than $T(i)$, can not preempt $T(i)$ when this holds $l_Q$ can be encoded as follows:

\[ \neg(T(i) \preceq T(j)) \]

\[ \equiv pr_j > pr_i \land l_Q \in owns_i \land state_i = ex \land c_i < r_i \land state_j = wt \land state'_j = pt \land state'_j = ex \]
If resource \( Q \), which needs to be accessed by tasks \( T(i), T(j) \) is not properly protected in both tasks, we may encounter a data race. A statement or sequence of statements that involve variables that are concurrently read/written by \( T(i), T(j) \), respectively, is called a critical section. Let us assume that \( pr_i > pr_j \). Consider also that we have a write-read conflict, that is, \( Q \in \text{interface} T(i) \land Q \in \text{controls} T(i) \land Q \in \text{external} T(j) \land Q \in \text{reads} T(j) \), and that \( Q \) is not protected in \( T(i) \). Given the fact that \( pr_i > pr_j \), \( T(i) \) could start executing first. Then, \( T(i) \) could be preempted by the lower priority task \( T(j) \), after the latter has locked the lock \( l_Q \) that protects the shared resource \( Q \), on its side. Such a situation gives rise to the data race formalized below:

\[
\text{race}(T(i), T(j), Q) \equiv pr_i > pr_j \land i \not= j \land T(i) \oplus l_Q T(j)
\]

In case \( l_Q, l_Q \) are the locks protecting \( Q \), and at some point in time they are held by tasks \( T(i), T(j) \), respectively, a variant of race condition can then be formally defined as:

\[
\text{race}(T(i), T(j), Q) \equiv i \not= j \land T(i) l_Q \oplus l_Q T(j)
\]

This definition comes close to the one proposed by Regehr and Reid, in their task scheduler logic [19].

Verifying a composition of timed modules, e.g. module \( \text{RTS}_{DM} \), against race conditions reduces to checking that the invariant \( \text{inv} \sim \text{race}(T(i), T(j), Q) \) is preserved by the respective composition.

Sometimes, a component that implements correct locking happens to be instantiated in a scenario where concurrent access to a shared resource is impossible [19]. This case is called redundant locking, meaning that, under such scenario, any sort of synchronization is useless. Detecting redundant locking could serve optimization purposes, as it may be followed by dropping those locks that are not necessary.

A redundant locking occurs if the boolean condition below holds in a composition of timed modules. The formula says that unnecessary locking, \( l_Q \), appears either if the resource \( Q \) is not shared, or if the concurrent tasks are non-preemptible.

\[
\text{rdnt\_locking}(T(i), T(j), Q) \equiv l_Q \in \text{owns}_i \land (\text{res} = \text{ns} \lor \neg(T(i) \circ T(j)))
\]

5.2 Enforcing Safe Locking

Priority Ceiling Protocol. One way of ensuring race-freeness, beside bounding priority inversion is by encoding the priority ceiling protocol (PCP) rules into our model. When using PCP, each lock is assigned a fixed ceiling that is equal to the highest priority among the tasks that need that lock. If some lock \( l_Q \) is owned by \( T(i) \), then tasks of priority higher than \( T(i) \) and lower than or equal to the ceiling of \( l_Q \) might become blocked by \( T(i) \). The rule for entering critical sections is based on the priority of the requesting task and the ceiling of the locks already owned by any other task:

A task \( T(i) \) that owns \( l_Q \) is granted access to \( Q \) if the priority of \( T(i) \) is strictly higher than the ceiling of any lock held by a task other than \( T(i) \). Otherwise, \( T(i) \) becomes blocked and \( Q \) is not allocated to \( T(i) \).

Besides the above rule, a task \( T(i) \) is said to block \( T(j) \) if \( T(i) \) has lower priority than \( T(j) \) and owns a lock of ceiling at least equal to the priority of \( T(j) \). Such a task \( T(i) \) prevents \( T(j) \) from entering a critical section. If \( T(j) \) owns a lock, then \( T(j) \) becomes blocked and task \( T(i) \) inherits \( T(j) \)’s priority [10].

Timed Modules with Priority-Ceiling-based Locking. Let us consider a set of shared resources \( Q_1, \ldots, Q_n \) protected by locks \( l_{Q_1}, \ldots, l_{Q_n} \). The length of \( \text{owns}_i \) is given by the number of locks needed by the real-time task \( T(i) \).

Next, we define the ceiling of a lock on resource \( Q_i \) as \( \text{ceil}(l_{Q_i}) = \text{Max}(pr_i) \), where \( pr_i \) is the priority of any task \( T(i) \) that needs \( l_{Q_i} \) in order to access \( Q_i \).

Enforcing correct (safe) locking reduces to transforming timed module \( T_{DM}(i) \) and the DM scheduler of Figure 4, such that the priority-ceiling resource allocation properties are encoded. However, we skip this process here and chose to only describe the properties to be checked against.

Considering that \( L \) is the set of locks owned by \( T(j) \), and that \( \text{ceil}(L) \) is the shortcut notation for the ceiling of any lock in \( L \), we formalize that task \( T(i) \) is granted access to resource \( Q_i \), as follows:

\[
l_{Q_i} \in \text{owns}_i \land \text{state}_i = \text{wt} \land q_i = pr_i \land \text{state}_j = \text{wt} \land (\forall j \not= i, L_j \in \text{owns}_j \land q_j = \text{ceil}(L_j)) \\
\Rightarrow \text{state}_i' = \text{ex} \land \text{state}_j' = \text{state}_j
\]

A task \( T(i) \) is blocking task \( T(j) \) iff:

\[
\text{state}_i = \text{wt} \land \text{state}_j = \text{wt} \land q_i = pr_i \land q_j = pr_j \land q_i < q_j \land (\forall k \cdot \exists Q_k \in \text{owns}_i \land \text{ceil}(Q_k) = q_i) \\
\Rightarrow \text{state}_i' = \text{state}_j' \land \text{state}_i' = \text{ex} \land q_i' = q_j
\]

The boolean condition \( q_i' = q_j \) means that the blocker task \( T(i) \) inherits the higher priority of the blocked task \( T(j) \).

Since in the actual implementation of MOCHA we can not prove refinement of timed modules, we need to verify that the new composition of tasks and scheduler is indeed implementing the protocol’s safe locking mechanism. For this, we have to check the composition against the invariant saying that, if, for two given distinct tasks \( T(i) \) and \( T(j) \), with \( pr_i \leq pr_j \leq \text{ceil}(l_{r_k}) \), \( l_{r_k} \) is owned by task \( T(i) \), then \( T(j) \) does not own any lock:

\[
\forall i, j, r_k \cdot i \not= j \land l_{r_k} \in \text{owns}_i \land \text{state}_i = \text{wt} \land q_i = pr_i \land q_j = pr_j \land q_i \leq q_j \leq q_j \leq \text{ceil}(l_{r_k}) \\
\Rightarrow \text{owns}_j = \emptyset
\]
In principle, this invariant suggests the way locks should be requested by tasks, hence, how to correctly transform module $T_{DM}(i)$.

6. Example: Three Periodic Real-time Tasks

We consider building a DM scheduler and resource manager for the schedulable task set of Figure 5. We assume that resource $Q$ is shared between tasks $T_1$ and $T_3$, whereas task $T_2$ does not share any resources other than CPU time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>$T_1$</th>
<th>$T_2$</th>
<th>$T_3$</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$T_1$</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$Q$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_2$</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_3$</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$Q$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Periodic tasks with shared resources.

At first, we abstract from $Q$ and we assume that all tasks are sharing a critical instant (all wait for CPU). The correct model of our three task real-time system is an instantiation of the generic model module $RTS_{DM} \triangleq ([| \text{module } T_{DM}(i) |] \text{ module } Sched_{DM}$, with $i \in (1..3)$. Note that the scheduler model encodes the urgency of task $T(3)$. Hence, at time 0, this task is scheduled first, after which it is preempted right away by higher-priority task $T(1)$, and later also by $T(2)$.

We have encoded this particular model in MOCHA, ignoring functionality and resource sharing. For this model, we have proved the correctness of the real-time encoding, in MOCHA, by model-checking it against the following timing property:

\[
\text{inv "timing" } \neg ((c_1 < r_1 \land c_{a1} = 5) \lor (c_2 < r_2 \land c_{a2} = 10) \lor (c_1 < r_3 \land c_{a3} = 20))
\]

Let us now assume that tasks $T(1)$ and $T(3)$ are controlling a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) memory buffer (or a Last-In-First-Out buffer, for that matter) [5]. A specific producer, described by $T(3)$, adds data to the buffer, while a particular consumer, modeled by $T(1)$ takes away data from the buffer, with respect to predefined rules. This kind of pipelined controller could be useful, for instance, in the design of hardware devices.

Our goal is to ensure that the buffer stays within its lower and upper bounds, after the producer and the consumer have updated it, respectively.

The tasks $T(3)$ and $T(1)$ take turns and update the buffer according to the following rules:

- each time the system executes, $T(3)$ has to add one or two items into the virtual buffer (it can not add zero);
- the consumer, $T(1)$, may choose to remove at most two items at a time, or leave the number of items unchanged, depending on the sizes of the respective data packages:
  - $T(1)$ is allowed to remove zero items, if it has removed one item from the buffer, in the immediately preceding step;
  - if $T(1)$ has removed zero in the previous round, it has to remove two items, in the current one;
  - if $T(1)$ has removed two items, it is mandatory that it removes only one item during the current round.

The variables of the system model are:

- $C : (0..7)$ - models the number of items in the buffer, as updated by the consumer $T(1)$, at the end of an execution round;
- $nr : \{0,1,2\}$ - represents the number of items removed by $T(1)$, from the buffer;
- $P : (0..7)$ - models the number of items in the buffer, as updated by the producer $T(3)$.

Next, we introduce variable $res : \{ns,s\}$ to specify when the considered resource $Q$ is shared and when it is not, and we initialize it to shared: $res := s$. We identify resource $Q$ with the group of variables $C$, $P$, and $nr$. We also consider that task $T(3)$ is using resource $Q$ during its entire execution time, whereas task $T(1)$ for the first 3 time units only. Here, we detail the functionality of just these two tasks, and their sharing of $Q$. Let us assume first the encoding of an incorrect synchronization mechanism between $T(1)$ and $T(3)$.

Rather than using locks $l_P,l_C$ to protect $P,C$ in both tasks, we assume that only $l_P$ is used, so it is being held by task $T(3)$, that is, $owns_{s3} := l_P$. We deliberately model the fact that once locked, the lock is not released until the end of $T(3)$’s execution time.

The functionality of module $T(1)$ and module $T(3)$ is given in Figure 6. Because of lack of space, we only show an excerpt of the scheduler module, which now acts as a resource manager too. The scheduler’s initialization contains $res’ := s$; it grants access to the shared resource first to task $T(3)$ due to its urgency, and then to any other max-priority task, provided that $T(3)$ has released lock $l_P$:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{i3} & \text{ state’}_i = \text{wt} \land c’_a = 0, \\
\rightarrow & \text{ ok’}_i := \text{true} \\
\text{i1} & (\text{state’}_i \neq \text{wt} \lor c’_a \neq 0) \land \neg \text{ok’}_i, \\
\land & \text{pr’}_i = \text{Max}(q’_1,q’_2,q’_3) \land \text{owns’}_4 = 0, \\
\land & \text{state’}_1 = \text{wt} \land c’_a \leq D_i - R_i, \\
\rightarrow & \text{ok’}_1 := \text{true} \\
\text{i3} & \text{ ok’}_i \land (\text{pr’}_i \neq \text{Max}(q’_1,q’_2,q’_3) \lor \text{owns’}_3 = l_P), \\
\land & \text{state’}_3 = \text{ex} \land c’ < r_i, \\
\rightarrow & \text{ok’}_3 := \text{false}
\end{align*}
\]

The safety property that we verify is:

\[
\text{inv "safety" } 0 \leq C < 7 \land 0 \leq P \leq 7
\]
MOCHA proves the invariant safety to hold for the composition of the three tasks and their scheduler, hence the encoding is functionally correct. However, since the model of Figure 6 does not permit task \( T(3) \) to release the lock \( l_P \) after executing the critical section, and \( T(1) \) has no resource protection, the real-time system execution stops prematurely, after a couple of steps. This is a result of the fact that module \( T(1) \) is preempted while executing the critical section, immediately after updating \( nr \); the task never gets the chance to update \( C \) also, and so \( T(3) \) keeps adding items to a buffer not actually updated by \( T(1) \). This suggests that the following race-condition

\[
\text{race}(T(1), T(3), Q) \equiv res = s \land \text{owns}_3 = l_P \land T(1) \land T(3)
\]

is satisfied. If we model-check the system model against the negation of the above predicate, MOCHA reports a counter-example, which demonstrates the existence of a race-condition between \( T(1) \) and \( T(3) \).

To remedy the errors, we now encode the priority-ceiling conditions into the scheduler and tasks. Besides lock \( l_P \), we also use lock \( l_C \), which will be requested by \( T(1) \). Hence, we have an extra variable \( \text{owns}_3 : \{0, l_C\} \). The ceiling of \( l_P \) is \( \text{ceil } l_P = 1 \), and of \( l_C \) is \( \text{ceil } l_C = 3 \). The priority-ceiling-based resource manager grants access to \( Q \) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\forall i = 1 & \quad (\text{state}^i_3 \neq \text{w} \lor \text{c}^i_3 \neq 0) \land \neg \text{ok}_i \\
& \land \text{pr}_i = \max(q^i_1, q^i_2, q^i_3) \land \text{owns}^i_3 = 0 \\
& \land \text{state}^i_3 = \text{w} \land \text{c}^i_3 = \text{D}_i - R_i \\
\rightarrow & \text{ok}^i = \text{true} \\
\forall i = 1 & \quad (\text{state}^i_3 \neq \text{w} \lor \text{c}^i_3 \neq 0) \land \neg \text{ok}_i \land \text{owns}^i_3 = l_C \land \ldots \\
\rightarrow & \text{ok}^i = \text{true} \\
\forall i = 1 & \quad (\text{state}^i_3 \neq \text{w} \lor \text{c}^i_3 \neq 0) \land \neg \text{ok}_i \\
& \land \text{pr}_i = \max(q^i_1, q^i_2, q^i_3) \land \text{owns}^i_3 = l_P \land \ldots \\
& \land \text{ok}_i = \text{true} \ldots
\end{align*}
\]

Traditionally, releasing locks should be made in the reverse order of their acquiring [20], yet we omit this process here. Model-checking the new composition against \( \neg \text{inv}'\text{race}' \neg \text{race}(T(1), T(3), Q) \) completes successfully.

7. Conclusions and Related Work

In this paper, we have proposed a unified model for describing and mathematically analyzing resource-constrained real-time embedded systems, within the timed modules formal framework of Alur and Henzinger [4]. We took advantage of the compositional properties of the framework and constructed the real-time system model as a parallel composition of \( n \) real-time tasks and their fixed-priority scheduler, all modeled as timed modules. In our model, we have also encoded the tasks’ functionality. We have started from a template version of an unscheduled task and encoded the scheduling policy via refinement, which is a correctness-preserving transformation. Thanks to the construction paradigm, one can first verify functional properties, on the unscheduled version of the model, and then check only extra-functional properties, like timing and/or concurrency-related properties, on the composed real-time model. To be able to verify the latter, we have formalized the notions of race condition and redundant locking. Last but not least, we have shown how to encode a safe locking concurrency protocol like the priority ceiling protocol. Unfortunately, the scalability of our method has not been addressed here, thus it remains to be exercised via more complex examples.

![Figure 6. Tasks T(1), T(3).](image-url)
analysis of such models, rather than on verifying their concurrency-errors freeness. Moreover, functional behavior is not included in the proposed model.

A comprehensive and elegant approach for detecting race conditions in Java programs, based on type-based analysis techniques, is developed by Abadi et al. [1]. Although their approach proves that a well-typed system is race free, it does not cover timing aspects.

The extended static checker for Java (ESC/Java) is a tool for static detection of software defects [13, 15]. It uses an underlying automatic theorem prover to reason about program behavior and to verify the absence of certain kinds of errors, yet without considering real-time verification.

A variety of other approaches have been developed for race condition and deadlock prevention. Model-checking based techniques have been advocated by Chamillard et al. [8], Madsen [18], etc. A similar approach to building correct-by-construction scheduled real-time system models is proposed by Altisen, Gößler, and Sifakis [2], where fixed point computation algorithms are combined with the incremental application of priority rules on timed-automata models. However, their construction method does not allow the separation of the scheduler as an actual component. Moreover, as in most of the other works, the model abstracts from the system’s functional behavior.

Seceleanu uses refinement for the construction of real-time scheduled systems [7], in the framework of action systems. Although the method leads to a correct-by-construction model, task functionality is not included, and verification of concurrency-related properties is not addressed.

In comparison to the above mentioned works, our approach has two main contributions: it shows how to integrate functional and timing behavior in the same real-time model, and allows for formal verification of properties related to such behavior, but also for concurrency-related conditions. As a plus, the underlying formalism of timed modules prevents deadlocks by construction and bears the major advantage of being truly compositional.

A weakness of the timed modules formal framework is the lack of implementation of the simulation relation used in proving refinements of such modules, and also of symbolic algorithms for model-checking against invariants and ATL formulas. We plan to address these deficits in our future research.

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References